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or business.14 In that case, the rentals are subject to self-
employment tax because the taxpayer is carrying on a trade
or business.15
In conclusion
While the question is not entirely free of doubt, it
appears that convincing arguments can be made that a lessor
of land under a cash rent or non-material participation share
lease should not have net earnings from self-employment
from the rents if the landlord-tenant and employer-
employee relationships are carefully established and
maintained. It is highly important, if the arrangement is to
be respected, to have a written lease between lessor and
lessee with standard terms and conditions, calling for a
reasonable rental. Moreover, it is important that employee
status be established in a written employment agreement
with a reasonable salary paid and that all details of both
relationships be carefully outlined in the corporate minutes.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally, Harl, Agricultural Law § 50.02 (1995);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 7.01 (1995).
2 Id.
3 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(a).
4 See Dugan v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-578 (taxpayer
did not make decisions regarding operations and seldom
inspected animals; no self-employment income under
livestock-share lease).
5 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b).
6 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(5).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402 (a)-2(b).
8 Id.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(d).
10 Rev. Rul. 60-112, 1960-1 C.B. 354.
11 Id.
12 Rev. Rul. 60-170, 1960-1 C.B. 357.
13 Id.
14 See Stevenson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-357
(rentals from portable sign operation).
15 Id. See I.R.C. § 1402(a).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
HOSTILE POSSESSION . The parties owned
neighboring land and the defendants sought to quiet title to
a strip of disputed land between the properties. The
properties had been owned by related parties and the
disputed strip had been farmed for hay by the defendants'
predecessors in interest.  The defendants argued that the
open use of the disputed land caused a presumption of
hostile use but the court held that where disputed property is
owned by related parties, hostile possession cannot be
presumed and does not occur until a distinct assertion of
hostile possession occurs. The defendants were able to show
that when the disputed land was conveyed in 1921, the
plaintiff's predecessor in interest acted as probate attorney.
The court held that the conveyance of the disputed property
to the defendants' predecessor in interest with the
knowledge of one of the defendant's predecessors in interest
was a sufficient declaration of hostile title to begin the
hostile possession for adverse possession purposes.
Talmage v. Ronald Altman Trust, 871 F. Supp. 1577
(E.D. N.Y. 1994).
FENCE. The disputed property had once been owned
by one person who split the land with a brother. A fence
was constructed between the two parcels but was located a
few feet on the original owner's land. The parcels were
eventually sold to the parties to this suit with the successor
in interest of the brother's portion claiming title to the
disputed strip by adverse possession. The evidence
demonstrated that the fence enclosed land which was usable
only for pasture and the successor claimed that the fence
created a presumption of adverse use. However, the other
party presented evidence that the fence in other places
followed the true boundary and that the fence deviated from
the boundary line at the disputed strip because the terrain of
the land made it more convenient. The court held that the
evidence of convenience overcame the presumption of
adverse possession created by the fence and denied the
claim of title by adverse possession. Hillard v. Marshall,
888 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1995).
The defendant claimed title to 80 acres of land by
adverse possession. The land was owned by various owners
and had been leased for pasture to various parties until at
least 1978. The defendant claimed to have entered the land
in 1978 and grazed cattle on the land. The defendant also
claimed to have raised crops on the land since 1980 and to
have registered the land with the ASCS. However, the
defendant provided no third party testimony or written
evidence of the defendant's possession of the land until the
mid 1980's. The court ruled that a fence was insufficient
proof of adverse possession where the land was used for
grazing cattle and that the jury was justified in finding that
the defendant had not provided sufficient proof of other
possession to obtain title by adverse possession. Clements
v. Corbin, 891 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The debtor owned a
farm in which the residence was destroyed by fire. The farm
was mortgaged to the FmHA (now CFSA). The debtor was
able to obtain insurance proceeds after a suit against the
insurance company. Almost immediately after receiving the
court award, the debtor transferred the money to certificates
of deposit and personal accounts. One of the CDs and the
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money in one of the accounts were then transferred to the
debtor's spouse who purchased another farm in the spouse's
name alone. The spouse claimed that the CD was purchased
from the debtor using money stored in the spouse's freezer.
The FmHA sought recovery of the farm as obtained through
the fraudulent transfer of the insurance proceeds. The court
held that the transfer of the funds to the spouse had
sufficient "badges" of fraud to subject the purchased farm to
a constructive trust in favor of the FmHA. The court noted
that the transfers were made without consideration, were
made soon after the debtor acquired the funds, and were
made when the debtor was in financial distress. In re Hicks,
176 B.R. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).
EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONALS. The debtor
sought court approval of post-petition employment of an
environmental consultant who also had a claim against the
estate. The trustee objected to the request, arguing that
Bankr. Rule 327 prohibited employment of professionals
with adverse claims. The court held that although
environmental consultants were professional, the
consultant's employment was allowed because the
consultant would not play any pivotal role in the
reorganization process so as to affect the consultant's claim
against the estate. In re River Ranch, Inc., 176 B.R. 603
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  The debtor was a cotton
merchant which purchased several truck loads of cotton
from a seller but which failed to pay for four truck loads
before filing bankruptcy.  The seller claimed a priority
interest in the cotton over the trustee's interest in that title to
the cotton was not intended to have been transferred to the
debtor until the cotton was paid for.  The cotton was
shipped F.O.B. the seller's location loaded onto the trucks.
The cotton was shipped to a warehouse operated by an
affiliate of the debtor but no warehouse receipts were issued
because the cotton was to be immediately shipped to cotton
mills.  The trustee argued that title to the cotton passed upon
delivery to the warehouse and the seller retained, at best, an
unperfected security interest in the cotton.  The court agreed
and found in addition that the warehouse did not hold the
cotton as bailee for the seller.  The court also held that the
seller's oral demand for reclamation of the cotton was not
sufficient under Section 546(c) because the seller failed to
show that the debtor was insolvent at the time the demand
was made.  In re Julien Co., 44 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 1995),
aff'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g, 128 B.R. 987 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor resided in a mobile home
which was permanently hooked up to electrical, sewage,
telephone and television cable service. The court held that
the mobile home qualified for the Florida homestead
exemption. In re Bubnak, 176 B.R. 601 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
The debtors lived in Texas but had purchased ranch land
in Oklahoma with the intent to move there when they
retired. The Oklahoma ranch did not have a residence. The
debtors listed the Oklahoma property as eligible for the
Oklahoma homestead exemption but moved to amend their
schedules to list the Texas property as eligible for the Texas
homestead exemption. The debtor husband made several
statements in judicial proceedings that the Oklahoma
property was their homestead but the wife made statements
only that the Oklahoma property was chosen as the
residence for exemption purposes because the bankruptcy
filing was an attempt to reorganize the ranch operation. The
court held that the debtors had the right to amend their
exemption schedule and that, because the wife made no
misrepresentations in judicial proceedings as to the debtors’
true residence, the debtors were not estopped from claiming
the Texas residence as the exempt homestead. Because the
Texas residence had already been sold by the trustee, the
court remanded the case for an appropriate remedy.  On
remand, the Bankruptcy Court allowed the debtors a money
judgment against the creditors who received the proceeds of
the sale. The debtors received the amount of the sale
proceeds less the costs of the sale and less the amount of
cash collateral received from one of the creditors. In re
Osborn, 176 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1994), on rem.
from, 24 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1994).
SETOFF. The debtor was a meat packer subject to the
Packers and Stockyards Act. The debtor had borrowed
money from a bank which allowed for setoff of the debtor's
accounts in the bank against the note. However, under the
note terms, the bank had agreed not to setoff any funds
which the debtor held as a fiduciary. The debtor had been
generally current on the note when the debtor's directors
decided to remove the president and named another
shareholder as president. At that time, the debtor opened a
commercial checking account and deposited the proceeds of
the sale of meat. The bank became nervous about the
changes in management and set off the checking account
funds against the note. The debtor argued that the setoff was
avoidable because the funds were subject to the PSA trust
for unpaid meat sellers. The bank claimed that it had no
knowledge that the funds were subject to the PSA trust;
therefore, the setoff was allowable. The court held that,
because the bank knew that the debtor was subject to the
PSA, the bank was required to first inquire as to whether the
funds were subject to the trust before setting off the funds
against the note. In addition, the court held that the bank
had actual notice that the funds were subject to the trust in
that the debtor informed the bank that the funds were from
the sale of meat and the bank knew that the debtor was not
paying meat sellers within the time required by the PSA.
Therefore, the court held that the setoff was avoidable under
the note language and because it violated the PSA. In re
Jack-Rich, Inc., 176 B.R. 476 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1994).
USE OF ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor owned a
farm which was being operated by a third party as a riding
stable. Under an agreement between the manager of the
riding stable and the trustee, the debtor took possession of
the farm and agreed not to sell estate property without the
trustee's consent. When the trustee visited the farm,
however, several horses and items of personal property
were missing. The court did not give much credence to the
debtor's explanation for the missing property but did not
order sanctions against the debtor because the horses were a
significant expense to the debtor and would have been
difficult to care for because the farm had no running water
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or electricity. In re Negro, 176 B.R. 671 (Bankr. D. R.I.
1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had entered into a
closing agreement with the IRS which started a one year
assessment limitations period. Before the IRS made an
assessment, the debtors filed for bankruptcy. The IRS did
make an assessment within the limitation period but the
assessment occurred during the automatic stay. The IRS
applied for retroactive lifting of the stay to allow the
assessment. The court held that the stay would be
retroactively lifted because the IRS would have been
entitled to the lifting of the stay had the IRS timely applied
for relief. In addition, the debtors had benefitted from the
closing agreement and had acknowledged in the agreement
that an assessment could be made within the year; therefore,
the found no unjust harm to the debtors.  In re Siverling,
95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,122 (Bankr. E.D. Calif.
1995).
CLAIMS. The debtor filed for bankruptcy in September
1993. The IRS failed to file a timely claim for 1992 taxes, a
portion of which were entitled to priority payment, because
the debtor did not list the IRS claim nor had the debtor filed
the 1992 tax return. The court held that the priority portion
of the claim was allowed whether or not timely filed, but
the nonpriority portion was not allowed. Matter of Rock,
176 B.R. 779 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DAIRY TERMINATION PROGRAM. The plaintiff
had applied for participation in the Dairy Termination
Program (DTP), submitting a bid on March 7, 1986. The bid
did not include heifers which were collateral for a loan
which was called in December 1985. In response to the loan
call, the plaintiff offered to transfer the heifers to the bank;
however, the heifers were not identified and possessed by
the bank until March 24, 1986, after the DTP bid. DASCO
determined that the plaintiff had failed to include all dairy
animals on the plaintiff's farm on the date of the bid and
denied DTP payments. The court held that the evidence
reasonably demonstrated that title to the heifers did not pass
until after the bid and that the plaintiff's offer to transfer the
heifers in December 1985 was insufficient to transfer title to
the bank at that time because the security agreement did not
give the plaintiff the right to transfer collateral in
satisfaction of the loan. Wardlaw Farms, Inc. v. U.S., 32
Fed. Cls. 476 (1994).
DEBT COLLECTION. The AMS has announced that
it will implement the debt collection procedures of 7 C.F.R.
Part 3, including reporting delinquent debts to credit
reporting agencies and administrative offsets. 60 Fed. Reg.
12533 (March 7, 1995).
EGGS. The AMS has adopted as final regulations
amending the definition of washed ungraded eggs,
clarifying the type of facilities and equipment to be supplied
to a grader, changing the grading room requirements to
include mechanized shell egg operations, and requiring
rinse water to be at least as warm as wash water. 60 Fed.
Reg. 12401 (March 7, 1995).
HORSES. The APHIS has adopted as final regulations
governing interstate movement of horses testing positive for
equine infectious anemia. Interstate movement directly to
slaughter will be allowed under a permit and a sealed
conveyance instead of official prior identification and
branding. 60 Fed. Reg. 14617 (March 20, 1995).
IMPORTS. The APHIS has issued interim regulations
amending the export and import regulations by removing
the provisions which allow the temporary, in-bond
importation of cattle from Mexico for feeding in the U.S.
and return to Mexico. The amendment resulted from the
NAFTA which allows importation of cattle from Mexico
without a bond, thus removing any source of penalty if the
cattle are not returned to Mexico. 60 Fed. Reg. 13896
(March 15, 1995).
The APHIS has issued interim regulations requiring all
sheep and goats imported from Canada and Mexico to be
accompanied by a permit unless the sheep or goats are
imported through land border ports for immediate slaughter.
60 Fed. Reg. 13898 (March 15, 1995).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. The FSIS
has announced that the dollar limitation for annual sales by
retail stores exempt from inspection is $35,700 for poultry
products and $38,900 for meat products for sales to other
than household consumers. 60 Fed. Reg. 13111 (March 10,
1995).
POULTRY PRODUCTS . The FSIS has issued
proposed regulations amending the definition of "fresh"
poultry products to include products whose internal
temperature has not been below 26 degrees Fahrenheit. 60
Fed. Reg. 14668 (March 20, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE. Shortly before the
decedent's death, the decedent made oral promises to
establish $10,000 charitable remainder trusts for the
decedent's heirs and several charities. However, the trusts
were not established before the decedent's death.  The
charities filed claims against the estate in state probate court
and the executor paid $10,000 to each charity and claimed
the payments as deductions for claims against the estate.
The court held that the oral promises to establish the trusts
were not enforceable under state law because the decedent
did not reasonably expect the charities to take or forebear
any action based on the oral promises; therefore, the claims
were not deductible under I.R.C. § 2053. The court also
held that payments made to the heirs were not deductible
because the promises to establish the trusts were not
contracted for full and adequate consideration as required
by I.R.C. § 2053(a). Levin v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
81.
The decedent and surviving spouse had entered into a
prenuptial agreement under which the surviving spouse
waived rights to spousal support, equitable distribution and
testamentary rights in exchange for the decedent's interest in
a cooperative apartment. The estate claimed a deduction for
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the interest in the apartment as a claim against the estate.
The court held that the testamentary rights waived by the
surviving spouse were marital property and could not
constitute consideration for the agreement to transfer the
apartment interest under I.R.C. § 2043(b)(1), (3); therefore,
the decedent's promise was not supported by adequate
consideration as required by I.R.C. § 2053. The court held
that the other rights waived by the surviving spouse had to
be grouped with the testamentary rights because the
apartment interest would be transferred only if the surviving
spouse was still married to the decedent at the decedent's
death.  Herrmann v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-90.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6]. * The children and
grandchildren of the decedent filed disclaimers of any
interest in certain property which passed to them under the
decedent's will. The disclaimers contained statements that
the disclaimers were intended to cause the passing of the
disclaimed property to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
Before the disclaimers were made, however, the estate sold
the property. The IRS ruled that the sale of the property did
not disqualify the disclaimers because the disclaimants had
no part in the sales which were carried out by the estate
executor. The IRS also ruled that the statements concerning
the passing of the disclaimed property did not disqualify the
disclaimers for federal estate tax purposes because the
language had no effect on the passing of the property to the
surviving spouse. Ltr. Rul. 9509003, Nov. 3, 1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* Under a 1951 will, a trust was created for the
decedent's son and a trust was created for four
grandchildren of the decedent. The remainder of the son's
trust passed to the grandchildren's trust when the son died.
The grandchildrens' trust was divided into two trusts, one
for one grandchild and one for three of the grandchildren
with the original trust assets distributed pro rata to the two
new trusts. The IRS ruled that the division (1) did not cause
recognition of gain or loss on the assets distributed, (2) did
not result in any taxable gift, and did not subject the trusts
to GSST. Ltr. Rul. 9509008, Nov. 29, 1994.
The decedent's 1981 will had established a trust funded
with a majority of stock in a family corporation. One
beneficiary was to receive priority mandatory payments
from the trust and all beneficiaries could receive
distributions of trust income and principal for their
education, health and support. The stock was sold by the
trust and the trust now contained liquid assets and greater
annual net income. The beneficiaries proposed to split the
trust into one trust for the preferred beneficiary and one
trust for the rest of the beneficiaries. To do this, the
preferred beneficiary had to renounce any interest in the
second trust and the other beneficiaries gave the preferred
beneficiary cash in compensation for the renunciation. The
preferred beneficiary would receive an annuity from trust
instead of the variable annual payments. The cash payment
and annuity were calculated to approximate the value of the
preferred beneficiary's interest in the original trust. The IRS
ruled that because the value of the preferred beneficiary's
interest in the resulting trust was equal to the value of the
interest in the original trust, the partition of the trust did not
subject the trust to GSST. Because not all of the secondary
beneficiaries contributed to the cash paid to the preferred
beneficiary, the contributing beneficiaries made gifts to the
noncontributing beneficiaries. Ltr. Rul. 9508018, Nov. 23,
1994.
An irrevocable trust was created in 1967 with one
beneficiary who was also a cotrustee with a corporate
trustee. The beneficiary amended the trust to provide for the
cotrustee to be an individual trustee to be appointed by a
court. The IRS ruled that the amendment of the trust would
not subject the trust to GSST. Ltr. Rul. 9508025, Nov. 28,
1994; Ltr. Rul. 9508026, Nov. 28, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* In 1985, the decedent executed a
durable power of attorney in favor of the decedent's son.
The power of attorney listed several specific powers granted
but did not include the power to make gifts of the decedent's
property. From 1983 through 1989, the decedent had a
history of making gifts to family members. In 1990 through
1992, the son made several gifts to himself and other family
members, including shares of stock owned by the decedent;
however, the total of these gifts was many times the amount
of the decedent's previous gifts. The son filed a gift tax
return for the gifts and paid the gift tax.  Some of the stock
was sold prior to the decedent's death in 1993. The IRS
ruled that because the power of attorney specifically named
several powers but did not include the power to make gifts,
the gifts made by the son within three years of the
decedent's death were revocable and included in the
decedent's gross estate. The IRS also ruled that the basis of
the transferred stock which was not sold prior to the
decedent's death was increased to fair market value for
estate tax purposes but the basis of the stock which was sold
was not increased. Ltr. Rul. 9509034, Dec. 4, 1994.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* Instead of
taking under the decedent's will, the surviving spouse
elected to take the Tennessee statutory one-third share of
the decedent's estate. The court held that under Tennessee
case law, the elective share had to be reduced by a pro rata
share of the estate's secured debts; therefore, the amount
eligible for the marital deduction was the one-third share
decreased by the share of the estate's secured debts.
Tennenbaum v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-48.
The decedent's will established several trusts, including
a marital trust funded with the decedent's separate property
and the decedent's 50 percent share of community property.
The surviving spouse was the income beneficiary with the
decedent's two children to receive the trust corpus, one
outright and the other in trust with further remainders to that
child's children. The trustees proposed to split the marital
trust into two trusts and make a partial QTIP election for
one of the trusts. The trustees planned to split the QTIP trust
into two trusts, each with one child as remainder holder,
make a reverse QTIP election for one of the trusts with
grandchildren as secondary remainder holders, and allocate
the decedent's GSST exemption amount to that trust. The
IRS ruled that the splits of the trust could be made to
qualify for QTIP, reverse QTIP and the GSST exemption
elections. Ltr. Rul. 9509029, Dec. 2, 1994.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The IRS has revoked
the following ruling.  At the decedent’s death, the decedent
was trustee and beneficiary of a trust established by the
decedent’s predeceased spouse. The decedent had the power
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as trustee to distribute trust corpus to the decedent or the
decedent’s children for their “support, comfort, happiness
and welfare.” The IRS ruled that the trust corpus was
included in the decedent’s gross estate because the decedent
held a general power of appointment over the trust corpus
not subject to an ascertainable standard. Ltr. Rul. 9510001,
Oct. 31, 1994, revoking, Ltr. Rul. 9318002, Jan. 15, 1993.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent died in 1978 and the estate included farm property
eligible for the special use valuation election. The estate
valued all property at fair market value but made a
protective election for the farm property for special use
valuation. The estate also elected to pay the estate tax in
installments. The estate tax return was examined, a
deficiency was assessed from an adjustment of value of
nonfarm property and a closing letter was issued in 1981. In
1992, when the last installment was due, the executor filed
for a refund and for perfection of the special use valuation
election. The IRS ruled that the examination of the tax
return and issuance of the closing letter "finally determined"
the values of the estate property and the values were
"agreed to following an examination;" therefore, the estate
had 60 days after issuance of the closing letter to perfect the
special use valuation election under Treas. Reg. §
20.2032A-8(b). The IRS also ruled that the use of
installment payment of the tax did not affect the limitation
period. Ltr. Rul. 9508002, Nov. 2, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH. The taxpayers owned all of the stock of a
corporation which sold on commission items manufactured
by others. The shareholders' agreement provided that the
corporation is to redeem all of the shares of a stockholder
who dies. The taxpayers had transferred by gift several
shares to their children without retaining any powers or
rights to the transferred shares. The corporation amended
the shareholders' agreement to provide that at the death of a
shareholder, all shares transferred by the shareholder are
also to be redeemed. The agreement provided a formula for
the redemption price which approximated the fair market
value of the shares at a shareholder's death. The IRS
recognized that the taxpayers had the power to change the
shareholders' agreement but stated that the taxpayers'
fiduciary duty as directors prevented them from changing
the redemption formula. The IRS ruled that the shares
transferred to the children would not be included in the
transferor's gross estate unless the taxpayers changed the
agreement to provide for redemption of the shares at other
than fair market value. Ltr. Rul. 9509027, Dec. 1, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
"CONTRACT WITH AMERICA TAX
RELIEF BILL OF 1995"H.R. 1121
CAPITAL GAINS. Individuals would be allowed a
deduction of 50 percent of the net capital gain for taxable
years after December 31, 1994. The capital gain exclusion
for sales of certain small business stock, enacted in 1993,
would be repealed. Collectibles are excluded from net
capital gain but an individual could elect to have a
maximum tax rate of 28 percent apply by forgoing the
indexing of the basis of the collectible.
BASIS INDEXING. Except for C corporations and
interests held by C corporations in other entities, taxpayers
would be allowed to adjust for inflation the basis of capital
assets and assets used in a trade or business, held for more
than three years, and acquired after December 31, 1994.
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The Bill provides a
maximum alternative minimum tax rate on net capital gain
of a corporation of the higher of the corporation's regular
tax rate or 25 percent.
The Bill also repeals the adjustment to AMTI for
installment sales occurring after December 31, 1995.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The Bill provides for allowing
losses on the sale or exchange of a personal residence as a
capital loss deduction for sales and exchanges occurring
after December 31, 1994.
UNIFIED CREDIT.  The Bill increases the unified
credit from $192,800 to $248,300 over three years
beginning in 1996: $229,800 in 1996; $239,050 in 1997;
and $248,300 in 1998. In 1998, the credit would allow for
tax exempt gifts and estates up to $750,000. After 1998, the
credit would be indexed for inflation.
EXPENSE METHOD DEPRECIATION. The Bill
would increase the annual maximum amount of allowed
expense method depreciation starting with property placed
in service in 1996:





SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. The Bill would
increase the maximum wages or self-employment income
allowed for individuals receiving social security benefits
before the benefits are reduced by  earnings:






ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has issued
procedures for obtaining consent for changing the
accounting method as required by Treas. Reg. §§ 1..263A-8
through 1.263A-15 (interest capitalization rules). Rev.
Proc. 95-19, I.R.B. 1995-12.
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayers guaranteed loans made by
a friend to support the friend's business. When the friend
filed for bankruptcy, the taxpayers had to pay on the loan
and claimed the amount of payments as a business bad debt
deduction. The court held that the loan payments were not
eligible for the business bad debt deduction because the
taxpayers were not in the business of making loans. The
appellate case is designated as not for publication.
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Friedman v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,141 (11th Cir. 1995), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1992-588.
CASUALTY LOSSES. The taxpayers contracted with
a carpenter to remodel their home. After the work was
completed, the taxpayers sued the carpenter for theft of
equipment and for damages for the cost of replacing
defective work. The taxpayers claimed a casualty loss
deduction for the value of the equipment stolen and the
costs of repairing the defective work. The court held that
except for the loss from the theft, the costs of replacement
of the defective work was not a deductible casualty loss
because the loss was not sudden. The case has been
designated as not for publication. Friedman v. Comm'r,
95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,141 (11th Cir. 1995),
aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1992-588.
ENERGY CREDIT. The IRS has announced the
inflation adjustment factor and reference prices used in
determining the availability of the renewable electricity
production credit for taxpayers producing electricity using
wind or closed-loop biomass resources. For 1995 the
reference factor is 5.4 cents per kilowatt hour for wind
facilities and 0 cents for biomass facilities. The credit is 1.6
cents per kilowatt hour.  Notice, March 20, 1995.
INVESTMENT INTEREST. The taxpayers had excess
investment interest deductions for one tax year which the
taxpayers carried over to the next two taxable years. The
IRS denied the deductions in the carryover years because
the carried over interest did not exceed the taxpayers'
taxable income for the carryover years. The court agreed
with Sharp v. U.S., 14 F.3d 583 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and Beyer
v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1990), that the statute
was unambiguous that excess interest deductions were
allowed to be carried over to subsequent taxable years
regardless of the taxpayers' taxable income in the carryover
years. Haas v. U.S., 861 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
PARTNERSHIPS
LIABILITIES. A partnership entered into a short sale of
non-related corporate securities. The cash proceeds of the
sale and additional funds were used as collateral for the
sale. The partnership remained obligated to produce the
stock to close out the short sale. The IRS ruled that the
partnership obligation is a partnership liability under I.R.C.
§ 752, increasing the basis of the partners' interests in the
partnership.  Rev. Rul. 95-26, I.R.B. 1995-14.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in March
1995, the weighted average is 7.30 percent with the
permissible range of 6.57 to 7.96 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.57 to 8.03 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-
11, I.R.B. 1995-13.
S CORPORATIONS
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. The stock of an S
corporation was held by a family member and a voting trust
with family members as beneficiaries. One of the
beneficiaries wanted to retire and entered into a redemption
agreement under which the corporation could redeem up to
10 shares a year with all shares redeemed by 2002. The
shares were to be redeemed at fair market value. The IRS
ruled that the redemption agreement did not create a second
class of stock for purposes of the S corporation election.
Ltr. Rul. 9508022, Nov. 25, 1994; Ltr. Rul. 9508023,
Nov. 25, 1994.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
April 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.80 6.69 6.63 6.60
110% AFR 7.50 7.36 7.29 7.25
120% AFR 8.19 8.03 7.95 7.90
Mid-term
AFR 7.34 7.21 7.15 7.10
110% AFR 8.09 7.93 7.85 7.80
120% AFR 8.84 8.65 8.56 8.50
Long-term
AFR 7.67 7.53 7.46 7.41
110% AFR 8.45 8.28 8.20 8.14
120% AFR 9.24 9.04 8.94 8.87
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
GROWTH HORMONES. The plaintiff was a custom
feeder of cattle owned by others. The plaintiff purchased
synthetic growth hormones manufactured by the defendant.
When the cattle did not gain weight as expected, the
plaintiff sued in negligence, strict liability, and for breach of
express and implied warranty. The plaintiff sought damages
for loss of profits. The court held that the tort actions were
not allowed because the plaintiff did not own the cattle
injected with the hormones. The court also held that the
plaintiff could not collect economic losses in actions for
breach of express or implied warranties. Tomka v. Hoechst
Celanese Corp., No. 93-869 (Iowa 1995).
TRACTOR. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff
was operating a tractor manufactured by the defendant. The
tractor rolled over while the plaintiff was mowing the grass
on a slope. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer under the
Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine and
alleged that the tractor was defective because it did not have
a rollover protection system (ROPS). The trial judge had
instructed that the plaintiff's contributory negligence would
be a defense to the action. The court held that the
instruction was proper and upheld the jury verdict for the
defendant. Haisten v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 648 So.2d
561 (Ala. 1994).
The plaintiff's decedent was killed when driving a
tractor manufactured by the defendant. The tractor had a
front end loader attached and the decedent was pulling a
brush hog for cutting grass on a slope when the tractor
rolled over on to the decedent. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was negligent in selling the tractor without a
rollover protection system (ROPS) and for failing to retrofit
the tractor with a ROPS. The decedent had been informed
that a ROPS was available for the tractor but the decedent
had refused the option. The evidence showed that the
decedent was familiar with ROPS and knew about the





on slopes without ROPS. The court held that the decedent
assumed the risk of operating the tractor without a ROPS
and that the defendant did not owe a duty to supply a ROPS
once the decedent refused the ROPS option and used the
tractor without the ROPS. The court also held that the
defendant did not owe a duty to retrofit the tractor with a
ROPS unless the defendant started a program to retrofit all
of its tractors. Morrison v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 891
S.W.2d 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURAL VEHICLES. The defendants had a
hay grinder custom made for their hay grinding business in
which they transported the grinder to other farms and
ground the hay on site. The defendants argued that the
vehicle was an implement of husbandry exempt from the
oversized vehicle restrictions under Iowa Code § 321.1(32).
The court held that an implement of husbandry included
only implements used by the owner on the owner's farm
such that highway use was limited to travel between the
owner's parcels of property. Prickard v. State, No. 93-
1551 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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